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I. Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of Case 
The nature of the case involves a dispute surrounding the interpretation of a "reservation" 
in a Warranty Deed. The deed reserved to Grantor "all oil, gas and minerals ... " Appellant Ida-
Therm, LLC ("Idatherm") believes the reservation did not include "geothen11al resources." 
Respondent, Bedrock GeotheTI11al, LLC ("Bedrock") believes the reservation of "all minerals" 
included "geothermal resources" Agreeing with Bedrock the district court held a "mineral" 
reservation in a deed severs the surface and subsurface estates. Idathen11 believes such an 
interpretation is not appropriate under Idaho law; is contrary to the will of the people of the state 
of Idaho; and would affect every landowner in Idaho that owns real estate conveyed with a 
"mineral" reservation. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
Idatherm filed a Complaint in the District Couri of the Seventh Judicial District, of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County Bonneville. Bedrock filed an Answer asseliing affirmative 
defenses and counterclaims. Following discovery, Bedrock filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on or about February 15, 2011. IdaTherm filed a response objecting to the motion on 
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April 13,2011. On May 26,2011, the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, issued a 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 11, 2011, a 
Judgment in favor of Bedrock was entered. 
III. Concise Statement of the Facts 
On March 19, 1946, Arthur J. Bell and Vinnie O. Bell as Grantors conveyed land to CC 
MaIm by way of a Warranty Deed ("Bell Deed"). See Affidavit of Lance A. Loveland, R Vol. II, 
p. 229-230, Exhibit 1. The conveyance was recorded in book 52 of deeds, page 215, official 
records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
The Bell Deed, reserved to Arthur and Vinnie Bell "themselves, and to their heirs and 
assigns, all oil, gas, and minerals, in, on, or under the surface of said lands .... " See Affidavit of 
Lance A. Loveland, R Vol. II, p.229-230, Exhibit 1. 
Idathenn and Bedrock both claim an interest in the geothermal rights by way of the Bell 
Deed. Bedrock claims its interest by way of a lease agreement, see Idatherm Complaint, R Vol. 
I, p. 50-120, Exhibits D through U. with the heirs and successors of Arthur and Vinnie Bell. 
Idatherm claims its interest also by way of lease. See Idatherm Complaint, R Vol. I, p. 
23-49, Exhibits A, B and c., from the heirs and successor of CC Mann and who are the present 
owners of the property. 
IV. Issues Presented on Appeal 
1. Did the district court error in interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
language set forth in the Bell Deed and expand the intent of the mineral 
reservation? 
2. Did the district court fail to give effect and meaning to all the words of the Bell 
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Deed? 
3. Is Treasure Valley Concrete. Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 978 P.2d 233 (1999) 
instructive on the issue of severance? 
4. Did the district court error in failing to apply the statutory definition of the 
Geothermal Resource Act? 
5. Is Idaho Code §47-701(l) inconsistent with the Geothennal Resource Act? 
V. Standard of Review 
In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the standard of review is the same as the 
district court's standard in ruling upon the motion. Sherer v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 143 
Idaho 486, 489, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006). This Court exercises free review in determining 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the prevailing paliy was entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. Andersen v. Profl Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 745-46, 118 
P.3d 75, 77-78 (2005). 
VI. ARGUMENT 
1. Did the district court error in interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
language set forth in the Bell Deed and expand the intent of the mineral reservation? 
Yes. 
A. Introduction 
The case before this COUli centers on the 1946 Bell Deed and the interpretation of the 
reservation made by the Arthur and Vilmie Bell for "all the oil, gas, and minerals, in on, or under 
the surface of said lands ... " Affidavit of Lance A. Loveland, R Vol. I, p. 229-230, Exhibit 1. 
More specifically, did Arthur and Vinnie Bell intend to reserve geothermal resources when they 
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reserved all "minerals" in the Bell Deed? In order for Bedrock to prevail, the Court would have 
to interpret the reservation of "mineral" in the Bell Deed included "geothermal resources." 
B. Overview 
In its Memorandum Decision the district court recognized the goal of deed interpretation 
is to "seek and to give effect to the real intention of the pariies." R Vol. II, p. 257, L. 6-7. It also 
noted "[w]here a deed is unambiguous, however, the pariies' intent must be ascertained from the 
language of the deed as a matter oflaw without resori to extrinsic evidence." R Vol. II, p. 257 L. 
9-11, citing C&G. Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766,25 P.3d 76,80 (2001). 
The district cOUl1 then cites Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63-64, 175 P.3d 
748, 752-53 (2007) stating: 
If the language used by the parties is plain, complete, and 
unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be gathered from 
that language, and from that language alone, no matter what the 
actual or secret intentions of the pariies may have been. 
Presumptively, the intent of the pariies to a contract is express by 
the natural and ordinary meaning of their language referable to it, 
and such meaning cannot be perveried or destroyed by the cOUlis 
through construction, for the parties are presumed to have intended 
what the terms clearly state. Only when the language of the 
contract is ambiguous maya cOUli turn to extrinsic evidence of the 
contracting party's intent. 
The case the district court points out "no party to the action asserts the Bell Deed to be 
ambiguous." R Vol. II, p. 258 L. 1. It then declares, it would "be injudicious to conclude the 
term mineral is ambiguous," R Vol. II, p. 258 L. 23, and goes on to state, "[t]his COUl1 therefore 
concludes the meaning of the word 'mineral' and the intent of the par1ies should be ascertained as 
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a matter oflaw." R Vol. II, p. 258, L. 28 and p. 259 L.1-2. 
However, after citing the COlTect standard of interpretation of an unambiguous deed the 
district court failed to apply the law and analyze the Bell Deed on its "plain, complete, and 
unambiguous" language. Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63-64, 175 P.3d 748, 752-
53 (2007). 
For example, after noting Idaho's lack of interpretation of the term "mineral" and rather 
than looking at the Bell Deed's plain language the cOUli jumps into to a discussion of how 
"Foreign Jurisdictions" interpret "mineral" and summarizes what those courts have held. R Vol. 
II, p. 259-264. 
If, the district court had interpreted the Bell Deed as established under Idaho law 
Idatherm, believes the court would have and should have concluded that the natural and ordinary 
meaning and language of the Bell Deed expresses the intent of the parties to not reserve 
geothermal resources and such meaning "cannot be perveried or destroyed by the courts through 
construction, for the parties are presumed to have intended what the tenns clearly state." 
Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63-64, 175 P.3d 748, 752-53 (2007) 
C. Plain Meaning 
Looking at the Bell Deed and not resoriing to extrinsic evidence; the natural and ordinary 
usage of the word "mineral" demonstrates absolutely no intention of the parties to reserve 
geothermal resources. 
Idaho has a long established history of geothermal development for recreational and 
commercial uses in Idaho. Since the late 1800's, geothermal resources have been used in various 
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recreational and commercial applications. See Idaho Department of Energy Resources, 
"Geothermal, Detailed History," Feb. 9, 2010 (located at 
http://www.energy.idaho.gov/renewableenergv/historv.htm). R. Vol. I, p.208 L. 1-2. 
If, Arthur and Vilmie Bell had wanted to reserve geothermal resources, such language 
could have been included in the deed. It was not. The "parties are presumed to have intended 
what the terms clearly state." Swanson v. Beco Const. Co. 
Id. at 752-53. 
Looking at the Bell Deed the plain simple intention was for the reservation of "minerals" 
and NOT "geothermal resources." 
If, the true intent of deed interpretation is to give effect and meaning to the plain ordinary 
language and not some legal fiction; it is reasonable to assume that neither Arthur and Vinnie 
Bell as Grantor's nor, CC Matm as Grantee believed the reservation of "mineral" would include 
"geothermal resources." Otherwise, it would have been listed. 
Idatherm does not believe a reasonable person reading the Bell Deed reservation of "all 
oil, gas, and minerals ... " would conclude, (based on that simple expression of intent), Alihur and 
Vinnie Bell intended to reserve "geothermal resources." The district court's interpretation should 
have been no different and was thus, in error. 
VII. Did the district court fail to give effect and meaning to all the words of the Bell 
Deed? Yes. 
A. Conveyance language 
Closely related to the district comi's failure to interpret the plain, ordinary language of the 
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Bell Deed, is the fact the district court did not give consideration to all the language in the Bell 
Deed. This is important as the district court concluded, "the grantor thereby severed the mineral 
estate from Plaintiffs estate." R Vol. II, p. 265 L. 16-17. 
Idathem1 believes a review of all the language of the Bell Deed establishes it was not the 
intention of Arthur and Vinnie Bell to severe the surface from the subsurface as found by the 
district court. 
The Bell Deed reads: 
That the said pmiies of the first part, for and in consideration of the 
sum of ten and noll 00 Dollars, lawful money of the United States 
of America, to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, 
the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, 
bargained and sold, and by these presents, do grant, bargain, sell, 
convey and confinn unto the said party of the second part and to his 
heirs and assigns forever, all the following described real estate 
situated in BOlmeville County, State of Idaho, to-wit: (legal 
description omitted). Together with all ditch and water rights 
thereunto belonging and especially decreed right to 200 miners 
inches of water in Clark Creek. [ ] 
TOGETHER, with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments 
and appUlienances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, 
and the reversion or reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, 
issues, and profits thereof, and all estate, right, title and interest 
in and to said property as well as in law as in equity, of said 
pmiies of the first part. 
See Affidavit of Lance A. Loveland, R Vol. II, p. 229-230, Exhibit 1. (emphasis 
added). 
The impOliance of the highlighted language is shown by this Court's decision in Stucki v. 
Parker, 108 Idaho 929, 703 P.2d 693 (1985). The Stucki court analyzed a deed that conveyed the 
"surface" to one party and reserved to the grantor "all the phosphate and phosphate rock." 
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A dispute later arose as the successor to the grantor claimed an interest in all mineral 
rights and not just the phosphates which had been specifically reserved. Despite the fact the 
grantor only reserved the phosphate and phosphate rock, the Stucki court reviewed all of the deed 
language and noted that the grantees were only conveyed the "surface." 
Then, addressing the correct interpretation of a deed with a reservation, the Stucki court 
held that "the reservations relate only to that which was first conveyed, the surface. Without a 
construction in this manner, the insertion of the word surface becomes meaningless and only the 
reservation is of any import.[] To hold otherwise controvelis the clear intention of the grantor." 
Id. at 695. 
The Stucki Court emphasized the determining factor before it was the language used in 
the deed of conveyance. In overruling the District Court's decision, the Stucki Court stated: 
Id. at 696. 
Had the parties intended the entire estate, less the phosphate, to be 
conveyed, the usual conveyance language combined with a legal 
description of the propeliy would have achieved that goal. 
However, the grantor elected to convey specifically the surface 
rights. This effectively limited the conveyance to a transfer of the 
surface separate and apart from the subsurface. We are persuaded 
that the reservation of the phosphates was a limitation on the 
surface estate conveyed. Like the COUli in Large Supra, the 
reference to the phosphates directly modified the preceding words 
granting only a surface estate. 
The impOliance of Stuki was dismissed by the district court stating: "[b ]ecause Stucki 
addressed such a narrow issue, its holding provides little-if any-instructive value .. ,," R Vol. 
II. p. 265 L. 11-12. In its conclusion, the district cOUli goes on to state: 
This Court concludes the parties to the Bell Deed, by severing the 
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mineral estate, had a general intent to convey those commercially 
valuable, underground, natural resources of the Subject Property 
that are distinct from the soil itself. The evidence before this Court 
suggests geothermal resources are commercially valuable natural 
resources underlying the Subject Property. Furthem1ore, 
geothermal resources are distinct from the soil, and there is no 
evidence that Bedrock's development and use of the geothermal 
resources would destroy the surface or Plaintiffs' enjoyment of the 
surface. 
R Vol. II, p. 267 L.15-21. 
The district court's conclusion means it was the intention of the Bell Deed to severe the 
surface from the subsurface despite clear language showing otherwise. 
A careful review of the Bell Deed shows it was the intention of Alihur and Vinnie Bell to 
convey "all of the real estate" and "all estate, right, title and interest in and to the said 
property ... " Affidavit of Lance A. Loveland R Vol. II, p. 229-230, Exhibit 1. Such language 
does not evidence any intent to severe, the surface from the subsurface. 
Following the holding in Stucki, and viewing all the language of the deed there is no 
express intention in the Bell Deed to severe the two estates. The Bell deed uses the "usual 
conveyance language combined with a legal description of the property" to convey "all" of the 
real estate. By holding the Bell Deed severed the two estates, the district court renders 
meaningless the conveyance language of "all the real estate" and "all estate, right, title and 
interest." Thus, as noted by Stucki only the reservation becomes of "import." Stucki v. Parker, 
108 Idaho 929, 703 P.2d 693, 695 (1985). 
VIII. Is Treasure Vallev Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 978 P.2d. 233 (1999) 
instructive on the issue of severance? Yes 
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A. How broad is a mineral reservation? 
In concluding the Bell Deed reservation severed the surface estate the district court 
pointed out there is not a consistent interpretation of what a "mineral" reservation means. It 
noted some jurisdictions "have found the term 'mineral' to be ambiguous" R Vol. II, p. 253 L. 3, 
but points out "[m]ost courts, however, have found the tenn mineral to be unambiguous." R 
Vol. II, p. 253 L.9. The court then relies heavily on the findings of foreign jurisdictions both 
state and federal to conclude the reservation of "mineral" severs the two estates. Idathenn 
believes such a conclusion disregards in Treasure Valley Concrete v. State 132 Idaho 673, 978 P. 
2d 233 (1998). 
In Treasure Valley this very court had the opportunity to interpret a mineral reservation 
and declare the surface and subsurface estates to be severed. The Court chose not to do so. 
The Court in Treasure Valley was asked to interpret a 1940 deed which reserved to the 
State" the right to all coal, oil, oil shale, gas, phosphate, sodium and other mineral deposits 
contained in this land ... " Id. at 234. The deed also stated the conveyance was subject "to ... the 
provisions of §4 7 -701, Idaho Code, reserving to the State all Mineral rights in lands sold 
subsequent to the 8th day of May, 1923." Id. at 234. (emphasis added). 
Note, the deed contained language reserving "mineral deposits" and "all Mineral rights." 
The issue before the Court was to detel111ine if sand, gravel and pumice were included in the 
reservation of the 1940 deed. 
After going through the legislative history ofofI.C. §47-701, the Treasure Valley COUli 
recognized and acknowledged the States position and argument that the Court should interpret 
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and conclude the term "all. .. minerals of whatsoever kind or character requires the Court to 
define minerals broadly." Rejecting this request the Court notes and cites the district cOUli's 
reasoning stating: 
The district court stated that if sand, gravel and pumice were 
considered minerals, then the grant of land would be nearly a 
fiction because of the breadth of the reservation. 
Treasure Valley Concrete v. State 132 Idaho 673, 978 P. 2d 233 (1998). 
The COUli then concludes, "we hold that prior to the 1986 amendment, the legislature did 
not intend for sand, gravel and pumice to be among those minerals reserved by the State when 
endowment lands were sold." Id. at 237. 
While, the Treasure Vallev, case dealt with a deed reservation tied to statutory definitions, 
the holding is instructive in the Court did not conclude the mineral reservation was so broad as to 
severe the surface and subsurface estates, nor, did the COUli define mineral so broad as to include 
every conceivable "breadth of reservation." 
The Treasure Valley Court looked at the Plain language of the deed; the statutory 
reference in the deed and the specific facts of the case to determine the mineral reservation did 
not include sand, gravel and pumice. More instructive, the Treasure Valley Court could have but 
did not find the "mineral reservation" severed the surface from the subsurface. 
B. Case by Case review 
Idathem1 believes the approach taken in Treasure Valley when evaluating a mineral 
reservation is the approach the district cOUli should have used when reviewing the Bell Deed. 
Rather than make the sweeping determination that a mineral reservation severs the surface and 
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subsurface estates, Idatherm believes such reservations deserve a case-by-case approach. 
Idatherm recognizes (as the district court did) such an evaluation of a mineral reservation 
could increase the number of cases needing review. But, Idatherm does not agree with the 
district cOUli's conclusion that such "a holding would ulli1ecessarily encourage litigation to 
determine the scope of grants or reservations similar to that of the Bell Deed." "R Vol II p. 258 
L. 24-25." 
The fact there is very little case law in Idaho discussing mineral reservations (something 
the district court also noted R Vol. II, p. 259 L. 24") shows the district court's fear of unnecessary 
litigation is not likely. 
Further, a case-by-case review would prevent a broad sweepmg decision that would 
effectively conclude every landowner in the state of Idaho that holds his property based on a 
conveyance with a mineral reservation, ONLY owns the surface. 
IX. Did the district court error in failing to apply the statutory definition of the 
Geothermal Resource Act (GRA)? Yes. 
Idatherm believes the questions presented before this COUli can be decided on a review of 
the statutory definition of "geothem1al resource" as set out by the people of the state of Idaho 
embodied in the State Legislature. Specifically, the definition of "geothermal resource" declared 
in §I.C.42-4002. 
By following the definition of geothermal resource given by the legislature, the COUli 
avoids the need to determine if a reservation of a "mineral" severs the surface from the 
subsurface or ,;vhat the definition of a "mineral" is or how broadly to define it. Nor, would it 
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need to determine if the tenn "mineral" was ambiguous or unambiguous. By following the statue 
the Court can conclude a geothermal resource is not a mineral. It is "sui generis." 
Idaho Code §42-4002 which, is pmi of the Geothermal Resource Act ("GRA") states, 
"geothermal resources are found and hereby declared sui generis, being neither a mineral 
resource nor a water resource, but they are also found and hereby declared to be closely related 
to and possibly affecting and affected by water and mineral resources in many instances." I.C. 
§42-4002 (emphasis added). 
Bedrock tries to discount the statute by claiming it is only applicable to a narrow set of 
circumstances set out in the act and that it does not apply to "private conveyances." R Vol. I, p. 
242 L.1O-II. Bedrock supports this position by arguing the definition of geothennal used in the 
GRA is "only are effective '[w]henever used in this act''' R Vol. II, p. 242 L.16. 
The district court adopted this reasoning when it declared: 
The GRA governs the pennit, application, m1d fee requirements for 
development and use of geothermal resources. The definitions of 
section 42-4002 state they are applicable '[w]henever used in [the 
GRA].' The definition of geothermal resources in Idaho code 
section 47-1602 contains similar limiting language. Thus, this 
Court is not required to apply the definition of geothermal 
resources found in either section 47-1602 or section 42-4002(c) for 
purposes of construing the Bell Deed. 
"R. Vol. II, p. 267 L.3-8." 
Idathenn believes such and interpretation of the statute is wrong. 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
This court has stated: 
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The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. State v. Doe. 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 
P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain and "give effect to legislative intent." ld. Statutory 
interpretation begins with the literal words of a statute, which are 
the best guide to detennining legislative intent. ld. The words of a 
statute should be given their plain meaning, unless a contrary 
legislative purpose is expressed or the plain meaning creates an 
absurd result. ld. If the words of the statute are subject to more than 
one meaning, it is ambiguous and this Court must construe the 
statute "to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. To 
determine that intent, [this Court] examiners] not only the literal 
words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its 
legislative history. 
Doe v. Bov Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009). 
B. Application of the GRA 
Reviewing the plain words of the ORA it covers more than just permits, applications and 
fees as the district court found. R Vol. II, p.267, L.3-S." For example, it covers acts relating to 
the use, development and regulation of geothermal resources anywhere in the state of Idaho. The 
ORA touches on such matters as "Well abandonment" I.C. §42-4008, "Investigations-Hearings" 
I.C. §42-4004, "Powers and duties" and "Penalties-Enforcement Procedure," including the power 
to "enter onto private land" I.C. §42-4010. If, the definition of "geothermal resource" includes 
the ability to enter private land, it would seem the intent from a plain reading of the statute favors 
application to all "geothel111al resources." 
FUliher, under the ORA geothermal lS defined as "the natural heat energy of the 
earth ... which may be found in any position and at any depth below the surface of the earth .... " 
I.C. §42-4002. Such a definition would then apply to all land. Similarly, "person" is defined as 
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"any individual, natural person, general or limited pminership, joint venture, association, 
cooperative organization, corporation whether domestic or foreign, agency or subdivision of this 
or any other state, or any municipal or quasi-municipal entity whether or not it is incorporated." 
I.e. §42-4003. Certainly Bedrock, and Idatherm would be considered a "person" under this 
statute 
One of the stronger suggestions for showing the GRA applies to more than just the limited 
scope interpreted by the district court is I.C. §42-40 13 which, allows the director at his discretion 
when he so finds to order "persons" to develop a geothennal resource as a unit. 
I.C. §42-4013 (b): 
Id. 
Whenever the director finds that a geothermal resource area should 
be cooperatively operated as a unit to avoid waste, and the persons 
owning tracts or interests in such area refuse to enter into 
cooperative agreement pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section, 
the board, after notice and hearing, may issue an order that such 
area shall be operated as a unit. [] 
Nothing in this section requires persons to have requested a permit or be operating a well. 
It allows the director to order a geothermal resource area be developed as a unit for any tract or 
interest. This would include private land. The definition of "geothermal resource area" means 
"the same general land area which, in its subsurface, is under laid or reasonably appears to be 
under laid by geothermal resources ... " I.C. 42-4002( d) (emphasis added). 
Notice, even if it "appears" there is a geothermal resource the director can order the 
property and person to operate the site as a unit. Thus, there is no need for a well or permit to be 
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m place or requested before the director can order a geothen11al resource be developed in 
conjunction with other landowners' property. If the director found a geothermal resource area in 
the State of Idaho after notice and a hearing, the director could order the person to develop the 
geothermal resource as a unit even if said person had never even considered developing the 
resource. 
Even more enlightening and perhaps the clearest reason to apply the GRA to determine if 
a "geothermal resource" is a mineral in the state of Idaho is because the legislature has already 
done so. 
e. I.e. §42-4002 Applies to All Ground Water of the State 
Because of the valuable nature of water resources in Idaho, the legislature in I.e. §42-226, 
stated: 
I.e. §42-226. 
[T]he director of the department of water resources shall consider 
and protect the then11al and/or artesian pressure valves for low 
temperature geothem1al resources and for geothermal resources to 
the extent that he determines such protection is in the public 
interest. All ground waters in this state are declared to be the 
property of the state .... " 
There is no limitation to this "act." Rather, all ground water which, includes geothermal 
resources is declared to be property of the state. This position is supported by I.e. §42-230 
which defines ground water. 
Definitions -
a) "Ground water" is all water under the surface of the ground whatever may be the 
geological structure in which it is standing or moving. 
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(1) All ground water having a temperature of greater than eighty-five (85) degrees 
Fahrenheit and less than two hundred twelve (212) degrees Fahrenheit in the bottom of a well 
shall be classified and administered as a low temperature geothermal resource pursuant to section 
42-233, Idaho Code. 
(2) All ground water having a temperature of two hundred twelve (212) degrees 
Fahrenheit or more in the bottom of a well shall be classified as a geothermal resource 
pursuant to section 42-4002, Idaho Code, and shall be administered as a geothermal 
resource pursuant to chapter 40, title 42, Idaho Code. 
I.C. §42-23 0(1 )(2) (emphasis added). 
Thus, I.C. §42-230 includes all geothermal resources within the State and references 
directly to I.C. §42-4002. 
D. Pari Materia 
I.e. §42-226, I.C. §42-230 and I.C. §42-4002 et. seq. (GRA) relate to the same subject and are 
"pari materia." 
Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same subject. Grand 
Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1, 855 P.2d 
462 (1993). Such statutes are construed together to effect 
legislative intent. Id. Where two statutes appear to apply to the 
same case or subject matter, the specific statute will control over 
the more general statute. 
Gooding County v. Wybenga 137 Idaho 201, 46 P.3d 18,21 (2002). 
Reading these statutes together and giving effect to the more specific statute (I.C. §42-
226) the district court should have found all geothen11al resources are ground waters owned by 
the State and must be administered under the definition of "geothermal resource" as set out in 
I.e. §42-226, I.C. §42-230 and the GRA. 
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Even if it could be argued the ORA was limited to the "Act" as suggested by Bedrock and 
the district court, reviewing the ORA in pari materia with I.C. §42-226 and I.C. §42-230 would at 
a minimum show ambiguity which, as Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 224 P.3d 
494, 497 (2009) sets out would require the court to look to the intent of the legislature, and 
policy. 
E. Legislative Intent and Policy of the GRA 
The policy and intent of the legislature with respect to the GRA is set out III the 
Legislative Intent as recorded in Section 1 of S.L. 1972, ch. 301 wherein it states: 
It is hereby declared that the State of Idaho claims a right to 
regulate the development and use of all of the geothermal 
resources within this State and that geothermal resources are 
natural resources of limited quantity and of a unique value to all of 
the people of the State of Idaho. 
'The legislature of the State of Idaho fmiher declares that the 
geothermal resources of this State may provide an outstanding 
opportunity for enhancement of our economy and quality of life 
with a minimum of environmental degradation through a utilization 
of this energy source. It is also recognized that the process of 
utilization and development of our geothennal resources on a large 
scale may be associated with risks to the maximum sustained yield 
from these resources, risks to our valuable groundwater resources, 
and risks to the environment in the immediate locality of and 
around the installations at which such utilization is done.' 
'The legislature further finds that there is presently substantial 
interest in the geothermal resources of this State that regulation in 
the public interest is imperative, and that regulation must take 
effect in an early date.' 
'The legislature does therefore declare that it is the policy and 
purpose of this State to maximize the benefits to the entire State 
which may derived from the utilization of our geothermal 
resources, while minimizing the detriments and costs of all kinds 
which could result from their utilization. This policy and purpose 
is embodied in this act that provides for the immediate 
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regulation of geothermal resource exploration and development 
in the public interest.' 
Id. (emphasis added). 
It is also instructive, when determining the intent of the legislature to note the legislature, 
did not simply define geothermal resources, they state geothermal sources "are found and hereby 
declared to be sui generis, being neither a mineral resource nor a water resource .... " Such 
language shows the legislature not only intended to declare what a geothermal resource was, it 
"found" it was not a mineral. I.C. §42-4002( c). 
Based on the above Idathenn believes the COUli should adopt the definition of 
"geothermal resource" as set out in the GRA. The legislature clearly intended the definition to 
cover all geothern1al resources within the state of Idaho and found geothermal to not be a 
mineral. 
See also Idathenn's Brief in Opposition to Defendant Bedrock Geothennal, LLC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment R Vol. I, p. 216-218 for a discussion on why this COUli should 
respect the reasonable exercise of the legislature in declaring its intent and the policy of the State 
as it deals with "geothermal" and why the cOUli should rely on the definition of geothermal 
resources as set out by the legislature rather than deferring to foreign case law. 
X. Is Idaho Code §47-701(1) inconsistent with the Geothermal Resource Act? 
One final issue needs to be resolved concerning the application of the GRA to the Bell 
Deed. In the district court's rationale for not applying the GRA it stated, "the Idaho Legislature's 
classification of geothermal resources has not been consistent." R Vol. II, p.267 L.8-9. The 
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court then cites to I.C. §47-701(1) to show the supposed inconsistency stating, "Idaho Code §47-
701 (1) groups geothennal resources together with other minerals that are reserved when state 
lands are sold. Consequently, insofar as this Court may consult non-binding statutory treatment 
of geothem1al resources as persuasive authority, this Court is unable to draw any inferences from 
the legislature's multifaceted view of geothermal resources." R Vol. II, p. 267 L.9-12. 
However, the district court failed to apply the appropriate statutory construction when 
viewing the statutes. Idathem1 believes if the court had done so it would have reached a different 
conclusion. Such an analysis establishes the district court should have defined geothermal as "sui 
generis" and supports Idathenn's claim that geothem1al is not a mineral. 
"Statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the literal words of the statute. 
Grand Canyon Dories v. Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1,5,855 P.2d 462,466 (1993). The language 
of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning. Id. Where statutes are in pari 
materia (relating to the same subject matter), they should be construed together to give effect to 
legislative intent." State. Dept. of Health & Welfare ex reI. Lisby v. Lisby 126 Idaho 776, 779, 
890 P.2d 727,730 Idaho, (1995). 
The following statues discuss geothermal resources: 
1. I.C. §42-4002, et seq, the GRA which defines geothennal resources. 
2. I. e. §4 7 -1601, et seq. dealing with leases of State lands. 
3. I. e. §4 7 -1602, geothennal definitions. 
4. I.C.§47-701, dealing with Reservation of mineral deposits. 
5. I.e. §47-702(1), dealing with exploration and withdrawal of minerals. 
- 20-
6. I.e. §4 7 -704(2)(5), dealing with "Leases of mineral rights in state lands." 
7. I.e. §42-238. Dealing with well driller licenses and operator pennits. 
8. I.C. §42-230, cited above which, defines ground water, including ground water 
identified as a geothermal resource. 
9. I.C.§42-226. Declaring Ground waters are public waters, including geothennal 
resources. 
Reading these statues in pari materia there is no reason the district court should not have 
been able to draw inferences and give effect to the intent of the legislature. 
A. Mineral does not include Geothermal 
The only statues that could conceivable be found inconsistent among the various statutes 
referenced above is the one cited by the district court I.C §47-701(l) and I.C. §47-704(2) and 
(5). However, a careful review of the statutes, show that neither one defined "geothem1al 
resources." 
In fact, I.C. §47-701(1) seems to controvert the very rationale used by Bedrock and the 
district court in rejecting Idatherm's position that a "geothermal resource" is not a "mineral". 
More succinctly, if "geothen11al resources" were defined under the broad definition of 
mineral given by the District Court, R Vol. II, p.268 L.2, there would be no need for the 
Legislature to include geothem1al resources in the statute defining and reserving mineral deposits 
to the State. 
If, mineral in Idaho included geothermal, why expressly include it in the definition? 
Reading the two statutes together shows geothennal is NOT a "mineral." Thus, the need to make 
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sure it is reserved when the state issues a deed. Certainly, the district court would not also hold 
"oil" and "gas" to be a mineral? Yet, I.e. §47-701(l) includes "oil" and "gas" and "geothermal 
resources" when defining what is reserved to the state if the state issues a deed. 
Using, Bedrock's own argument and adopted by the court, Bedrock and the district court 
fail to note I.e. §47-701(l) is limited to "this chapter." What then is the intent of the statute and 
why include oil, gas and geothelmal in the definition of mineral, and mineral deposits? Because 
the legislative intent was to ensure these specific resources were included in any deed conveyed 
by the State. 
Thus, the statutes when read to give effect to all their meanmgs do not create a 
"multifaceted VIew of geothermal resources" R Vol. II, p.267 L.13, rather, it narrows and 
strengthens Idatherm' s position that mineral is not so broad as to include everything under the 
surface. 
Such a situation is similar to the casein Treasure Valley Concrete v. State 132 Idaho 673, 
978 P2d 233 (1998), cited above where the state argued that a "mineral" reservation included 
sand, gravel and pumice. The court ruled sand, gravel and pumice were not included in the 
definition until the legislature specifically "list these substances as minerals." ld. at 237. It was 
only when the legislature specifically listed these items were they considered reserved for the 
State despite the fact sand, gravel and pumice are clearly not "minerals." The same would be true 
for "oil" and "gas." They are no more a "mineral" than "sand" "gravel" or "geothennal 
resources." The cou11 in Treasure Valley, recognized this by noting the legislature has, over the 
years amended the statute to include numerous resources. For example it noted, "[i]n 1981, the 
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legislature again amended I.C. §47-701 to add 'geothermal resources' to the list of minerals 
reserved." Id. at 235. 
The intent of the statute is clearly to specify and reserve valuable resources to the State. It 
is NOT to define sand, gravel, oil, gas or even geothelmal resources; it is to make sure these 
separate resources are reserved to the State. 
Based on the above the GRA had previously defined geothennal resources for all the 
State of Idaho and the district court should have applied the same to determine "geothermal 
resources" are not a "mineral." The legislature has declared and found "geothermal resources" 
are neither a mineral nor water. They are "sui generis." For this reason, the Bell Deed mineral 
reservation should not have been interpreted by the district court to include geothennal resources. 
XI. Conclusion 
If the true intent of deed interpretation is to give effect and meaning to the plain ordinary 
language of the deed and not a legal fiction, it is reasonable to assume that neither Arthur J. and 
Vinnie O. Bell or CC Mmm believed that the reservation of mineral in the Bell Deed would 
include geothennal resources. 
FUliher, the District Court was in elTor in failing to apply all the plain, ordinary language 
of the Bell Deed as it intended to transfer "all real estate" and "all estate, right title, and interest in 
and to the said propeliy .... " Similarly, the District Court expanded the intention of Arthur and 
Vinnie Bell in finding that the mineral reservation severed the surface from the subsurface of the 
estate. 
Had the District Court applied the appropriate Idaho statutes specifically, the Geothermal 
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Resource Act read in para materia with I.C.§42-226 and I.C.§42-230 defining groundwater, the 
Court should have held that a geothelmal resource is not a mineral. 
Based upon the above, Idatherm respectfully requests that the Court hold that Idathenn is 
entitled to the geothem1al resources under the Bell Deed. 
-I£,. 
DATED this 30 day of January, 2012. 
PARSONS, SMITH, STONE, LOVELAND & 
SHIRLEY, LLP 
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